M & Z Legal – Advocates & Solicitors

Introduction

One of the recurring questions in proceedings under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 is whether a complaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation.

Although RERA establishes a comprehensive regulatory and adjudicatory framework, it does not prescribe one uniform limitation period for every complaint under Section 31.

This has given rise to questions concerning the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Article 137, and the circumstances in which a continuing breach may affect the computation of limitation.

The issue becomes especially important where the promoter’s default continues for several years or where an allottee discovers a defect long after possession or registration of the sale deed.

I. Section 31 and the Absence of a Uniform Limitation Period

Section 31 permits an aggrieved person to file a complaint with the regulatory authority or adjudicating officer for violation of the Act, rules or regulations.

The provision does not expressly prescribe a general period within which every such complaint must be instituted.

This omission raises an important interpretative question: can Article 137 of the Limitation Act, prescribing three years for certain applications, be automatically applied to every complaint under RERA?

The answer requires consideration of the nature of the proceeding, the statutory forum, the relief sought and the principles governing the applicability of the Limitation Act to special tribunals.

It would be legally unsafe to presume either that all RERA complaints are subject to Article 137 or that every RERA complaint may be filed indefinitely.

II. The Significance of Section 18(2)

Section 18(2) expressly provides that a claim for compensation arising from defective title shall not be barred by limitation provided under any law for the time being in force.

This is a significant legislative choice. By expressly protecting claims arising from defective title, Parliament recognised that such defects may emerge long after the original transaction.

The provision also raises a question of statutory interpretation: if Parliament expressly excluded limitation for defective-title compensation, should other RERA claims be treated differently?

The express protection under Section 18(2) cannot automatically be extended to every other claim under the Act. Equally, the limitation applicable to other claims must be determined by identifying the appropriate statutory and legal basis rather than relying solely on an inference from Section 18(2).

III. Continuing Wrong and Continuing Consequences

Section 22 of the Limitation Act addresses continuing breaches of contract and continuing torts, providing for a fresh period of limitation during the period of continuation.

However, a crucial distinction exists between a continuing wrong and the continuing effects of a completed wrong.

For example, a promoter’s failure to perform an ongoing statutory obligation may raise a different limitation question from a completed act whose financial consequences persist.

A claimant cannot avoid limitation merely by describing an old grievance as a continuing cause of action.

The nature of the underlying statutory obligation must be examined to determine whether the breach itself continues.

IV. Different Remedies May Attract Different Considerations

RERA provides multiple remedies, including refund, interest, compensation, regulatory directions and penalties. These remedies do not necessarily have identical legal characteristics.

A claim seeking refund following withdrawal from a project may require examination of when the right to refund arose.

A claim for compensation may involve the date on which the loss occurred or became legally actionable.

A complaint seeking compliance with an ongoing statutory obligation may require examination of whether the promoter remains in continuing default.

Consequently, the question of limitation should not be decided in the abstract, without reference to the precise relief sought.

V. The Role of Judicial Interpretation

The Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the applicability of the Limitation Act to special statutory forums are relevant to this analysis.

In Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634, the Supreme Court examined the scope of Article 137.

Subsequent decisions, including M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 7 SCC 58, have considered the operation of limitation principles in proceedings before statutory authorities.

These decisions must be read carefully in their respective statutory contexts. They do not dispense with the need to examine the particular scheme of RERA.

The relationship between the Limitation Act and RERA must therefore be approached as a question of statutory interpretation rather than a mechanical application of a three-year period.

VI. Conclusion

Limitation under RERA cannot be reduced to a universal proposition that every complaint must be filed within three years, nor can it be assumed that the absence of an express general limitation period renders every claim perpetually maintainable.

The appropriate analysis must consider the statutory provision invoked, the nature of the relief, the accrual of the cause of action, the applicability of the Limitation Act and whether the alleged breach is genuinely continuing.

Section 18(2) provides particularly strong protection for compensation claims arising from defective title.

For other claims, a careful, remedy-specific approach is necessary to reconcile legal certainty with the consumer-protection objectives of RERA.